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1. INTRODUCTION
For several millennia, the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers have
seamlessly provided water for one of the most ancient sites of civi-
lization.' In early times, Mesopotamian civilization- literally
"the land between the rivers"- relied upon these waters for sur-
vival.2 Years later, many other civilizations began utilizing these
waters including, most recently, Iraq, which for centuries has
been the dominant user of the waters from the Euphrates His-
tory provides little evidence of conflicts arising out of the use of
the two rivers; there had always been enough water for all. To-
day, however, the situation has changed drastically.
* Spoken by the sage Ut-napish-tim in the Mesopotamian epic of Gil-
gamesh. Gilgamesh was the mythological king of Erech in southern Mesopo-
tamia (present day Iraq).
"" J.D. Candidate, 2000, University of Pennsylvania Law School, B.A.,
1994, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Professors Thomas Naff and
Harry Reicher of the University of Pennsylvania and to Christie March for
their guidance on this project. Thanks also to ChrisLaFon and his team of As-
sociate Editors for their excellent work.
1 See DANIEL HILLEL, RIVERS OF EDEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR WATER AND
THE QUEST FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 92 (1994).
2 See id.
3 See ASSOCIATES FOR MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH ("AMER"), WATER
ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: TURKEY: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND
STRATEGIC (1988) [hereinafter AMER: TURKEY].
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Presently, three nations, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, share the
water of the Euphrates River.4 Historically, Turkey and Syria
have all but ignored the economic opportunities provided by the
Euphrates, leaving its waters almost exclusively to Iraq. In the
latter half of the twentieth century, however, both nations, par-
ticularly Turkey, have begun to appreciate the value of the Eu-
phrates and turned their attention and energies toward harnessing
the immense irrigation and hydroelectric potential of the river.
Of greatest significance is Turkey's Southeast Anatolia Develop-
ment Project (Gueneydogo Anadolu Projesi in Turkish ("GAP")):
a massive undertaking designed to develop the southeast regions
of Turkey through hydroelectric and irrigation projects along the
Euphrates River.
Since Turkey is the uppermost of the three Euphrates ripari-
ans, its project to control water flow of the river bears potentially
critical ramifications for Syria and Iraq, both of which lie down-
stream. The centerpiece of the GAP, the Atatiirk Dam, is a mas-
sive dual hydroelectric/irrigation dam- the ninth largest dam in
the world- that has virtually strangled the flow of the Euphrates,
causing great tension in the region. The Middle East is already a
water scarce region, and Turkey's restriction of the Euphrates
flow threatens to bring severe water shortages to both Syria and
Iraq.
7
The adverse effects that the GAP project will have on Syria
and Iraq cannot be overstated. Overall, the completed the GAP
project will diminish Euphrates River flows by as much as 50%.'
4 See NURiT KLIOT, WATER RESOURCES AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 100 (1994).
s See AMER: TURKEY, supra note 3, at 53.
6 See Frederick W. Frey, Power, Conflict, and Cooperation, RES. &
EXPLORATION, Nov. 1993, at 18, 29; see also HILLEL, supra note 1, at 106;
KLIOT, supra note 4, at 125-27.
7 See Priit J. Vesilind, The Middle East's Water: Critical Resource, NAT.
GEOGRAPHIC, May 1993, at 38, 50.
' Completion of the GAP was originally scheduled for the end of 2001, but
various factors have kept this ambition from becoming reality. One of these
factors has been the presence, discussed in greater detail below, of a large Kurd-
ish minority population in the regions to be covered by the GAP. The Kurds
have long presented a social and political problem for the Turkish government,
and the region has, for this reason, often been characterized by political insta-
bility. One of the various raisons detre for the GAP has been to address this
problem with the Kurds. Without question, the GAP will bring tremendous
financial prosperity to the region, which the Turkish government hopes will
stabilize the region and pacify the Kurds. In a somewhat more insidious mode,
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Since the Euphrates River makes up nearly 80% of Syria's total
surface water supply, the ramifications of such a reduction are
tremendous.9 In 1990, Syria's total water supply amounted to ap-
proximately 30.6 billion m3 per year. Of this amount, approxi-
mately 28.5 billion m3, or 93%, came from the Euphrates River."
At the same time, Syria's water demand for all uses amounted to
approximately 4.8 billion m3 per year, thus leaving a total water
surplus of 25.8 billion m' per year." Syria's water surplus, in
turn, left Iraq with plenty of water to meet its traditionally heavy
demand for Euphrates River water. With the advent of the GAP,
and particularly after the filling of the reservoir behind the
Atatiirk Dam, this situation has changed dramatically. Estimates
of Euphrates River flow after completion of the GAP 12 are dis-
Turkey also plans to attract a large number of"ethnic Turks" to the area, thus
diluting the Kurdish dominance in the region. This latter hoped-for effect has
caused significant resentment among the Kurds, to the point where the region
has been in more or less of a constant state of revolt. This has slowed comple-
tion of the GAP project significantly. See HILLEL, supra note 1, at 104. An-
other factor that has slowed the progress of the GAP has been the need to ac-
quire financing. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
('IMF") have at various points refused to fund the GAP project, or certain as-
pects (most notably the Atatiirk Dam), unless and until agreement was reached
between the riparians as to water sharing. Thus, Turkey often has been left to
find alternative methods to finance the project, including a tremendous amount
of internal financing. See id. at 105; KLIOT, supra note 4, at 125-26; Joseph W.
Dellapenna, The Two Rivers and the Lands Between: Mesopotamia and the Inter-
national Law of Transboundary Waters, 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 213, 230-31 (1996).
This task itself has been severely complicated by the Gulf War of 1990, after
which Turkey has complied with United Nations ("U.N.") sanctions against
Iraq, which had been until that point, Turkey's largest trading partner. See id.
at 231. Current estimates project final completion of the GAP somewhere be-
tween 2010 and 2040. However, this should not dilute the reader's impression
of the severity or immediateness of the water crisis in the region. As previously
mentioned, the centerpiece of the GAP, and its largest, most significant struc-
ture, the Atatiirk Dam, was completed in 1990. The dam and other completed
GAP projects have already caused serious consequences to Euphrates and Tigris
flows, which will be more thoroughly discussed below.
9 See KIJOT, supra note 4, at 138.
10 See id. at 137-41.
n See id.
12 The issue of measuring water-flow from the Euphrates, Tigris, and their
various tributaries has been another obstacle to finding a mutually agreeable
water-sharing system. Various experts have conducted studies over the years
and have come to different conclusions regarding the level of water flow. See
ARNON SOFFER, RIVERS OF FIRE: THE CONFLICT OVER WATER IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 74 tbl. 3.1 (Murray Rosovesky & Nina Copaken trans., 1999).
Part of the reason for this discrepancy stems from the experts' use of different
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tressingly low. Post-completion Euphrates flow to Syria is esti-
mated at approximately 12.6 billion m3 per year, of which 4.6 bil-
lion m3 per year will be return flow from Turkey.13 Adding the
rest of Syria's water sources creates a total water supply of ap-
proximately 14.8 billion n 3 .14 At the same time, due in part to
Syria's population growth and its own projects aimed at increas-
ing irrigation and hydroelectric power production, Syria's de-
mand for Euphrates water will increase to approximately 13.4 bil-
lion im 3 per year, leaving a total water surplus of only 1.4 billion
m 3 per year.15 Given the history of frequent drought in the re-
gion, this is a precariously low figure. More importantly, this
means that Syria will be able to release no more than 1.4 billion
m3 per year into Iraq. It shall become clear that his figure is en-
tirely inadequate.
Even if the water flow is drastically reduced, experts expect
Syria to continue to record a surplus, and, thus, afford it enough
water to meet its projected agricultural needs. However, Syria's
surplus would not leave Iraq with enough water to meet its own
needs, which means that Syria possibly would have to allow more
water to flow into Iraq than it would prefer, and perhaps would
have to reduce its surplus to a shortfall. This will have the direct
effect of forcing Syria to abandon previously irrigated farmland.
In any event, drought conditions are frequent in the region, and
Syria has an arid climate. 6 With such a low water surplus in non-
methods or different measuring points along the rivers. Naturally, politics has
also had an effect on perspective.
13 See id.
14 "Return flow" is a term used to describe water that has been taken out of
a river system for irrigation purposes and then returned to the system via run-
off or otherwise. Return flow water is almost always of substantially lower
quality than regular flow as the water picks up various soil deposits, pesticides,
and other chemicals during its use as irrigation water. This adds a layer of
complexity to the problems facing the sharing of the Euphrates and Tigris Riv-
ers, and will be discussed in fuller detail below. The United States, for instance,
has had a long standing agreement with Mexico regarding the quantity of water
to be released-by the United States into Mexico from the Colorado River. This
agreement originally did not cover quality, however, and a large portion of the
water that the United States sent to Mexico was return flow, to the detriment
of Mexican agriculture. See Frey, supra note 6, at 26-27.
"5 See KLIOT, supra note 4, at 141 tbl. 2.11.
16 See HILLEL, supra note 1, at 97; KLIOT, supra note 4, at 104-08. Further
evidence of the fragility of such a low water surplus figure in Syria is demon-
strated by the fluctuations in flow of the Euphrates River year to year. While
the normal natural flow for the Euphrates at the border between Turkey and
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drought years, a drought year after the GAP's completion could
be devastating to Syria's agriculture, economy, and even its ability
to provide drinking water to its growing population."7 Even
without the possibility of a water shortfall caused by Iraqi de-
mand or by drought, the reduced water supply already contem-
plated will affect Syrian hydroelectric production. Presently, 25%
of all Syrian electricity is generated by hydroelectric power sta-
tions located along the Euphrates. The anticipated reduction in
Euphrates flow due to the GAP will reduce this production. 8
For Iraq, the situation is not much better. Iraq is not as de-
pendent on the Euphrates River as Syria is because it receives a
large amount of water from the Tigris River, but, since it is the
lower-most riparian in the system, it is more vulnerable to upper
riparian use of both rivers." Thus, Iraq gets only that portion of
water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers that Turkey and Syria
release. Furthermore, much of the water that Iraq will receive in
the post-GAP era will be return flow from the GAP projects as
well as Syria's own irrigation projects."
In total, Turkish and Syrian projects on the Euphrates could
reduce the flow of the Euphrates into Iraq by as much as 80%,
and, while figures for the Tigris are not as clear,21 there will cer-
Syria is around 30 billion m3 per year, it has been measured as low as 16.8 bil-
lion m3 per year. See HILLEL, supra note 1, at 95, 102. Given Syria's expected
post-GAP water demand of 13.4 billion m' per year, it is obviously unlikely
that after removing Turkey's massive water consumption figures that Syria
would be able to approach its needs even in a moderate drought year. Of
course, if Syria is unable to meet its water needs, Iraq likewise would be unable
to do so.
" While most nations of the world have recently come to understand the
dangers of unfettered population growth, Syria intentionally fosters a high level
of growth, believing that a large population will lead to greater national
strength and bring heightened legitimacy to its claim as leader of the Arab
world. See HILLEL, supra note 1, at 107.
18 See KLIOT, supra note 4, at 142.
19 See 1-ILLEL, supra note 1, at 97; KLIOT, supra note 4, at 101. Iraq's cli-
mate is also more arid then either that of Syria or Turkey, so Iraq relies on the
combined waters of the twin rivers as a whole more than either of its upstream
co-riparians.
20 Syria's projects are primarily located on the Euphrates and its tributaries.
While the Tigris does pass through Syria, it does so only for a stretch of some
35 miles along one of its borders.
21 The GAP project does include substantial use of the Tigris River, includ-
ing four large dams which the Turks hope will serve to irrigate 1,482,000 acres
of land. See JOHN F. KOLARS & WILLIAM A. MITCHELL, THE EUPHRATES
RIVER AND THE SOUTHEAST ANATOLIA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 43 (1991).
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tainly be some reduction of its flow due to the GAP. The flow
from the Euphrates and Tigris and their tributaries accounts for
98% of Iraq's surface water. In 1990, Iraq received an annual av-
erage of 28.4 billion m3 of water from the Euphrates River,
which, along with its substantial Tigris River flow of approxi-
mately 50 billion in3 , easily met Iraq's total water demand of 48.5
billion cubic meters? However, it is estimated that after comple-
tion of the GAP, river flow will be reduced to 10.6 and 40 billion
n3, respectively, while Iraq's water demand is increased to 61.7
billion in3 . This reduced flow and increased demand thus leaves
Iraq with a total water deficit of 10.6 billion in3.24 This water
short-fall ultimately will affect 5.5 million farmers and force Iraq
to abandon as much as 1.8 million acres of farmland.25 Since Iraq
already imports 80% of its food,26 it cannot afford such reductions
in domestic agricultural production.
In a region known for its instability, the possibility of armed
conflict over these issues is very real. In fact, Iraq and Syria have
come extremely close to armed conflict more than once in the re-
cent past. In 1975, as Syria filled the recently constructed Tabqa
dam, Iraq's Euphrates flow was reduced by approximately 67%,
resulting in massive crop failuresY' Syria denied responsibility for
Iraq's water shortage2' and insisted that Iraq use the Tigris River
to compensate for the reduced water flow from the Euphrates.
Both countries deployed troops to their border, and armed con-
flict was averted only because of last minute mediation by the So-
However, Turkey has thus far concentrated its efforts on the Euphrates and
plans to begin its work on the Tigris River upon completion of the Euphrates
projects. As mentioned earlier, Syria contains very little Tigris River flow, and
is loathe to engage in any projects thereon for fear of further exacerbating its
relations with Iraq.
' See KLIOT, supra note 4, at 143.
23 See id. at 144.
24 See id. For an extremely comprehensive set of estimates of Tigris and
Euphrates River flow in each of the three countries, seeKoLARS & MITCHELL,
supra note 21, at 85-105.
25 See KLIOT, supra note 4, at 146.
26 See Hunger and the Butcher's Bill, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 1990, at 45.
21 See HILLEL, supra note 1, at 108.
28 One of the common retorts by upstream riparians in this system to the
complaints of downstream riparians is that the alleged water shortfall is caused
not by the water use of the upper riparian, but by inefficient water use by the
downstream riparian.
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viets and Saudis.29 Similarly, when Turkey filled its Atatiirk dam
in 1990, the extreme resulting reduction in Euphrates River flow
brought the entire region to the brink of war." The extreme na-
ture of such conflicts between the riparians has led to an intensive
search for a peaceful solution to the region's water flow problems.
Scholars have looked to international law for possible answers.
However, though many scholars feel strongly that it has the po-
tential to at least blueprint a solution, international law has thus
far failed to do so.
This Comment focuses on the potential of international law
to provide the desired peaceful, long-term solution to the Euphra-
tes River Basin water crisis. In particular, it argues that existing
international law conventions and treaties offer inadequate solu-
tions because they do not overcome many of the existing obsta-
cles. Some of these 'obstacles stem from the nature of interna-
tional law, while others are the result of the particular
circumstances in the Middle East. The Comment concludes with
several suggestions on how international law might address some
29 See id. at 108-09.
30 Most of the near-misses of armed conflict have been between Iraq and
Syria. Their propensity for conflict was due in large part to Syria's position as
Iraq's immediate upper riparian; to Turkey not having made, until quite re-
cently, any significant use of the Euphrates or Tigris Rivers; and to the long-
standing enmity between Syria and Iraq. See 1-IILLEL, supra note 1, at 107-10;
KLIOT supra note 4, at 160-62. Generally, one country will, due to a combina-
tion of factors, natural and man-made, have a bad crop season because of water
loss. The suffering country will blame its upper riparian for its perceived insuf-
ficient access to water flow, negotiations will fail, troops mass, and then, in the
eleventh hour, the upper riparian will agree to release additional water. In fact,
this is the series of events that led to several of the existing accords on water re-
lease. Specialists in international relations and political science theorize that
Syria and Iraq eventually should form an alliance or other combined front
against Turkey, which is now responsible for most of the water flow reductions
affecting both Syria and Iraq. See, e.g., Frey, supra note 6. Several factors, how-
ever, have prevented this from occurring thus far. First, as mentioned above,
Syria and Iraq have long been politically and socially hostile towards each
other. Second, the entanglements that Iraq has had in the last decade with the
United Nations and, particularly, the United States make it difficult for Iraq to
put any significant military or even political pressure on Turkey. If Iraq settles
its dispute with the United States, it will become much more able to join with
Syria in putting pressure on Turkey. The United States, however, is increas-
inly relying on Turkey as a strategic partner in the Middle East and it is cer-
ta~nly possible that the United States' continued pressure on Iraq is in part mo-
tivated' by its desire to retain friendly relations with Turkey. This struggle
highlights the fact that the discussed water rights issues transcend simple water
rights issues and have taken on a more powerful political significance.
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of these obstacles and remarks on international law's general po-
tential to alleviate conflict in the Euphrates River Basin crisis.
Because the Euphrates River Basin water crisis in a complex
issue, Section 2 provides general background information on the
Euphrates River Basin, Turkey's GAP, and the traditional posi-
tions/arguments of the three Euphrates River riparians, Turkey,
Syria and Iraq. Section 3 focuses on the attempts of international
law to provide a solution to the crisis, both in the Euphrates
River Basin and in similar areas of water crisis around the globe.
The subsequent sections discuss the major obstacles that block in-
ternational law solutions in the Euphrates River Basin conflict.
Section 4 focuses on structural limitations inherent in interna-
tional law, Section 5 on political relations between the three ri-
parians, and Section 6 on inconsistencies between international
law and Islamic law.
2. THE EUPHRATES RIVER BASIN AND ITS WATER CRISIS
2.1. Topography of the Rivers
The source of the Euphrates River is in the mountains of east-
ern Turkey."1 From there, it flows southward through Turkey,
enters Syria, and then passes into Iraq. It then flows southward in
Iraq until it joins with the Tigris River at the Shatt al-'Arab, after
which the two rivers flow together into the Persian Gulf." In
sum, the Euphrates river is approximately 1,875 miles long, with
41% of its length in Turkey, 24% in Syria and 35% in Iraq. The
31 See HILLEL, supra note 1, at 92-95.
32 See id.; KLIOT, supra note 4, at 102-04; Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 216-
18. In fact, there are now three rivers that come together to flow into the Per-
sian Gulf. The third is a large drainage canal that runs from a point just south
of Baghdad between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in the lower Mesopotamian
basin to its base in the Persian Gulf. The canal was first planned and under-
taken by American engineers in an attempt to help Iraq more effectivelysalin-
ize its farmland. However, because of various tensions between Iraq and the
United States, the United States eventually discontinued the program. Despite
various European efforts to complete the project, the"Third-River" remained
unfinished after the Gulf War of 1991. At this point Iraq, despite objections
from the Americans, finished the project on its own. Foreign observers suspect
that the canal has the "hidden purpose" of eradicating the swamp-lands so that
the Shiite dissidents in the region will be displaced. Environmentalists also
have criticized Iraq because the canal destroyed a distinct ecosystem. See
HILLEL, supra note 1, at 100-02.
33 See SOFFER, supra note 12, at 74 tbl. 3.1.
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water contributing to the flow of the Euphrates originates in
Turkey as snow melt, with rainwater added at various points as
well. The Euphrates also receives water from various tributaries,
all of which join the river in Turkey. Thus, nearly 98% of all wa-
ter contributing to the Euphrates flow originates in Turkey,
while only an additional 2% comes from Syria, and none from
Iraq.34 Thus, Iraq has only a weak sovereign right to the water
flow because it does not naturally own any of the resource.
Conversely, several man-made factors detract from the flow of
the Euphrates, most notably dams and other projects, such as the
GAP, conducted by each of the three riparian states. Another
source of flow reduction is evapotranspiration, the process of
transferring moisture from the earth to the atmosphere by evapo-
ration of water and transportation of plants, which has both natu-
ral and man-made causes. The Euphrates is especially vunerable
to evapotranspiration because it is an "exotic" river, in that it be-
gins in lush mountains and then flows through a large arid climate
before eventually emptying into the sea.3" Along the course of the
river, as it passes through the arid regions of lower Syria and Iraq,
large amounts of water are lost.36 Water in the basin also is lost
due to evapotranspiration of the large reservoirs of water with
great surface area created by the multitude of dams built by all
three riparians along the Euphrates.37 For example, evapotranspi-
ration at the Tabqa Dam in Syria is estimated as high as 630 mil-
lion m, per year." This loss combined with the estimated 476
million m3 of water lost per year from the Keban dam constitutes
34 See Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 218; HILLEL, supra note 1, at 92-95;
KLIOT, supra note 4, at 102-04. The Tigris River is smaller and runs faster. The
remainder of this Comment will focus on the Euphrates River, and will men-
tion the Tigris only occasionally. This focus is not meant to imply that the Ti-
gris River is not an essential component of the river system or a significant fac-
tor in the effort to find a solution to the water-sharing problems. However, the
GAP poses a much greater threat to the Euphrates River than to the Tigris
since, as mentioned above, Turkey plans to develop the Tigris only after finish-
ing the projects on the Euphrates. One should -keep in mind that although
Syria and Turkey both claim that Iraq should use the Tigris before complaining
about Euphrates flow levels, Turkeydoes plan on developing the Tigris, which
will eventually result in a reduced flow on that river as well.
35 See Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 218. An "exotic" river is one that origi-
nates in one type of climate and flows through another type of climate, redic-
ing its flow as it approaches the sea. See id.
36 See KLIOT, supra note 4, at 121-22.
37 See id.
" See id. at 122.
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an overall reduction flow of 3.5% percent lost through storage at
just two of the several large dams on the Euphrates. 9 Because
there are twenty-two dams and nineteen hydroelectric stations
contemplated by the GAP in Turkey alone, these problems will
only get worse."
2.2. The GAP Project in Turkey
The GAP is a massive endeavor to increase the economic po-
tential of Turkey through the development in six of its southeast-
ern provinces. The GAP includes the construction of dams, hy-
droelectric power plants,4 irrigation projects, and infrastructure,
all aimed at dramatically increasing and improving agricultural
production in the region as well as the general quality of life for
the people who live there.42 The project is not yet completed, but
the anticipated results are extraordinary. Estimates suggest that,
upon completion, nearly five million acres of land in the six re-
gions will be irrigated, representing nearly 64% of the total irri-
gated land in Turkey.43 Some estimates also suggest that the GAP
may create a food surplus in excess of six billion dollars.'
The benefits of the GAP to agriculture are obvious. Before
the GAP, the six provinces produced very little, and most of what
was produced was cereals, pulses, grains, and tubers. Productivity
has been very low as a result of the dryness of the soil due to lack
39 See id.
40 See id. at 125; KoLARs & MITCHELL, supra note 21, at 19-23; see Del-
lapenna, supra note 8, at 218-19, 230. Of that figure, 15 of the dams and 14 of
the hydroelfectric facilities will be located on the Euphrates River. See id.
"' See supra Section 2.1.
42 See KOLARS & IMTCHELL, supra note 21, at 19.
4" See id. at 23; Mehmet Tomanbay, Sharing the Euphrates: Turkey, RES. &
EXPLORATION, Nov. 1993, at 53-55; TED Case Studies: Atatfirk Dam and Envi-
ronment (last modified Sept. 1997) <http://www.american.edu/projects/
mandala/TED/ATATURK.htm> [hereinafter TED Case Studies]. But see
KLIOT, supra note 4, at 131 (estimating only a 53% increase in irrigated land as a
result of the GAP). This discrepancy in figures highlights an aspect of the Eu-
phrates River basin situation that has frustrated efforts to come to a solution:
the lack of agreement and coherence in figures ranging from flow figures to
evaporation rates to potential benefits of projects in terms of potential increases
in irrigable land. It is difficult to evaluate competing claims and counterclaims
when one does not have a firm grasp on the numbers. In this specific case,
however, one can see that even by using the lower estimate of increased land
under irrigation in Turkey as a result of the GAP, the increase is still enormous
and of tremendous economic value to Turkey.
44 See TED Case Studies, supra note 43.
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of irrigation. After the completion of the GAP, the regions are
expected to produce millions of tons of corn, vegetables, grapes,
oil-seeds, pistachio nuts, and fruit, turning a once desolate area
into the "breadbasket of the Middle East."4" The social benefits
for the peoples of the region are clear, but there are also signifi-
cant economic benefits, as Turkey plans to export many of the
crops raised in the six provinces. Turkey has historically gained a
tremendous economic boost from the sale of agricultural prod-
ucts. In the late 1970's, however, Turkey's agricultural produc-
tion was significantly reduced. A further benefit to Turkey
should come in the form of increased hydroelectric production
through the construction of dams and other hydroelectric facili-
ties. The scope of this endeavor is so huge that Turkey expects to
increase its total energy output by 70% to 80%.46
Along with the agricultural and economic benefits of the
GAP, Turkey hopes to recognize a socio-political benefit as well.
The six provinces of the southeastern Anatolia region support a
significant minority Kurdish population.' This group, which has
been quite rebellious, has been a thorn in the side of the Turkish
government, as well as a political embarrassment. Turkey hopes
to bring stability and satisfaction to this Kurdish minority
through the development of the GAP regions.4"
2.3. Historical and Current Water Use Among the Riparians
Historically, Turkey has not harnessed the potential of the
Euphrates River. Despite the fact that the Euphrates is a tremen-
dous source of water and a potentially tremendous source of agri-
cultural and economic development, it flows through the south-
east regions of Turkey, far away from the traditional center of
Turkish civilization. Syria historically has used relatively small
amounts of the Euphrates River flow also, leaving the lion's share
of the use of the river to the lowermost riparian, Iraq.49 Before
'5 KLIOT, supra note 4, at 125.
46 See id.
47 See id.; see also SOFFER, supra note 12, at 89.
48 See KLIOT, supra note 4, at 165; AMER: TURKEY, supra note 3.
41 Of course, the Euphrates-Tigris River basin, and the waters of the twin
rivers were the life-blood of the ancient Mesopotamian civilizations located in
modern-day Iraq. The oldest known settlements in the area date from 7,000
B.C. But the first real civilization to appear there, and perhaps in the world,
were the Sumerians, inventors of Cuneiform, the world's first form of writing.
Eventually, the Sumerians were conquered by the Akkadians, who in turn gave
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the completion of the Atatfirk Dam (the centerpiece of the GAP),
the average annual consumption of Euphrates waters for all pur-
poses was 1972 Mm3 for Turkey, 2133 Mm 3 for Syria, and 29,351
Mm3 for Iraq.5" As will be discussed in more detail below, Iraq
believes that this ancient pattern of usage entitles it to continued
preference among the three riparians.
With the advent of the GAP, and to a far lesser extent similar
development projects in Syria, these traditional patterns of Eu-
phrates River water use have changed dramatically, and will con-
tinue to do so as the GAP draws nearer to completion. Whereas
historically, Syria has been able to count on an flow of roughly
27,000 Mm3 per year from the Euphrates"' and Hit Rivers, and
Iraq could count on an average of approximately 29,000 Mm 3 per
year5 2, these numbers have decreased drastically and are expected
to further decline as the GAP nears completion. 3 Kolars and
Mitchell estimate that by the year 2001, Iraq's share of water after
Turkish and Syrian withdrawals will be 4473 Mm3 per year, con-
stituting nearly an 85% reduction in flow since the construction
way to the Babylonians andAssyrians. Beginning around 2300 B.C., these two
civilizations existed as neighbors for some time, with theAssyrians to the north
in what is now northeastern Syria and northern Iraq, and the Babylonians to
the south, covering most of the remainder of present-day Iraq. Babylon and
Assyria relied heavily on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers for navigation and
agriculture. Particularly in southern Iraq, where rain is less abundant, the
Babylonians developed elaborate irrigation networks using both the Euphrates
and the Tigris. During the peak of these two civilizations, the land between the
rivers supported as many as 20 million inhabitants. But this was the height of
effective use of the twin rivers. In 539 B.C., the Persian Empire took control of
the region. Soon after in 331 B.C., Alexander the Great and the Macedonians
conquered the region and were followed in turn by the Seleucids, Parthians,
Romans, Sassanids, and Arabs. During this time the once efficient system of
irrigation along the twin rivers began to erode due to ineffective management.
Then, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Mongol hordes swept
through the region (as they did through most of the Near East), and destroyed
what was left of the system. This marked the end of any form of effective irri-
gation use of the rivers for several hundred years. It was not until 1911 that
Iraq began construction on the first modern project in the basin, theHindiya
Barrage, a system on the Euphrates carrying water to the surrounding fields
year-round. See KLIOT, supra note 4, at 117-20; 13 THE WORLD BOOK
ENCYCLOPEDIA 346 (1987).
50 KOLARS & MITCHELL, supra note 21, at 89.
51 See id.
52 See id. at 100-01, 255.
51 See id. at 255.
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of the Atatiirk Dam. 4 If these figures are born out, they would
constitute a water crisis for Iraq. Syria also faces significant reduc-
tions in water flow as a result of the GAP.
While raw shortage is a major aspect of the Middle East water
crisis, it is not the only one. Both the GAP in Turkey and similar
projects in Syria have irrigation as their focus. While this cer-
tainly takes large percentages of the natural flow of the Euphrates
out of circulation permanently, much of the water used for irriga-
tion is ultimately returned to the river drainage system. When
this water is returned to the system it often is polluted with salt,
pesticides, and other agricultural residue.5 Thus, the quality, in
addition to the quantity, of the remaining water is severely im-
pacted by the GAP. As mentioned above, if all of the planned
GAP projects are completed, both Syria and Iraq will have to
abandon millions of acres of farmland for lack of irrigation, suffer
a drastic reduction in hydroelectric capacity, and, at least during
drought years, face potential shortages of drinking-water.
3. ATTEMPTS AT A SOLUTION USING PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW
3.1. Conceptual Underpinnings
To date, scholars analyzing the dilemma caused by trans-
boundary watercourses 6 have developed four basic legal concepts
to address the issue. These are: (1) absolute territorial sovereignty;
(2) absolute territorial integrity; (3) limited, or restricted, territorial
sovereignty; and (4) the community theory.'
s' See id. As discussed above, this figure likely is no longer precise due to
delays in the completion of the GAP projects. The point remains, however,
that these are estimates generally applicable to the situation whenever the GAP
is completed.
" See, e.g., Frey, supra note 6; I-ELLEL, supra note 1, at 269.
56 Transboundary watercourses are those that travel through more than
one sovereign state.
" See R. Andrew Lien, Note, Still Thirsting: Prospects for a Multilateral
Treaty on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers Following the Adoption of the United
Nations Convention on International Watercourses, 16 B.U. INT'L LJ. 273, 292
(1998).
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3.1.1. Absolute Territorial Sovereignty
The doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty (otherwise
known as the "Harmon Doctrine") 8 states that a sovereign nation
has the right to do whatever it chooses with the water of a trans-
boundary watercourse which flows through its borders. 9 This
position is often adopted by upper riparians and has its roots in
the concept of national sovereignty, a central tenet of public in-
ternational law. It also is grounded in power politics, and is most
often adopted by upper riparians when they also enjoy regional
military superiority.
When faced with an upper riparian adopting the Harmon Doc-
trine, a lower riparian may resort to military force if that option is
available, or hope for the cooperation of the upper riparian. 61 As
58 See id. at 292 n.137.
s See Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 244-45; Lien, supra note 57, at 292. The
doctrine was introduced in 1895 by then U.S. Attorney-GeneralJudson Harmon
in response to Mexican protests of the U.S. diversion of the Rio Grande. See id.
at 292 n.137; see Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("MFA"), Wa-
ter Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq (last visited Feb. 23, 1999)
< http://www.access.ch/tuerkei/GRUPF/water/contents.htm > [hereinafter
MFA]. The United States is the upstream riparianvis-a-vis Mexico and exercises
nearly plenipotentiary power over the Americas. Furthermore, when the up-
stream riparian is also the dominant military power in the region, the temptation
for that nation to call upon the Harmon Doctrine is palpable. Perhaps for this
reason, other nations widely criticized this doctrine. Ironically, in a vivid illustn-
tion of the political nature of transboundary river disputes, the United States e-
pudiated the Harmon Doctrine some time later when it found itself the dowi-
stream riparian in a water dispute with Canada. See HILLEL, supra note 1, at 269-
70.
0 See HILLEL, supra note 1, at 269-73; Frey, supra note 6, at 29-30.
61 See HILLEL, supra note 1, at 269. Egypt is a p rime example of such a
situation. While Egypt is the lower riparian state in the Nile River valley, it is
also the superior regional military power. Thus, though the situation in the
Nile River valley is still complicated, the upperriparians in the system, Sudan
and Ethiopia, are largely prevented from exercising the Harmon Doctrine by
threat of military action from Egypt. This threat has not always been an op-
tion for Egypt and, in any event, Eypt acquired an added degree of protection
from its upstream neighbors through the construction of the famous and im-
mense Aswan High Dam located on the Nile, approximately 250 kilometers
north of the border between Egypt and Sudan. Completed in 1970, the dam
created Lake Nassar, the largest man-made lake in the world, extending some
450 kilometers to the south of the High Aswan Dam. In contrast to the
Atatiirk Dam or the rest of the GAP project in Turkey, the Egyptian and Su-
danese governments engaged in intense negotiations during the construction of
the dam{ to ensure an "equitable" water-sharing arrangement. As compensation
for the various effects that the High Aswan Dam would have on Sudan, includ-
ing the forced relocation of several Nubian settlements which were to be
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discussed in greater detail below, Turkey has adopted the Harmon
Doctrine with respect to the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. Iraq has,
of course, criticized the legitimacy of this position and, indeed, it is
a difficult position to sustain in the international community. Syria
is in the interesting position of being the middle riparian, and, thus,
has at times adopted the Harmon Doctrine vis-d-vis Iraq, while
criticizing Turkey for the same position.
Other nations have advanced arguments based on absolute ter-
ritorial sovereignty in other transboundary river disputes. The
U.S. dispute with Mexico has already been mentioned.' In an-
other example, in 1961, India constructed the Farakka Dam on
the Ganges River, which originates in China, flows through Ne-
pal and India, and eventually flows into Bangladesh. Bangladesh
disputed the legality of the project, as it had a substantial effect on
Ganges River flow into that country.63 The two nations engaged
in extensive negotiations regarding the project based on the no-
tions of "shared resources," and "equitable utilization," but they
could not reach an agreement. Ultimately, as creation of the dam
drew near to completion, India asserted that the construction of
such a dam is "the natural right of any country," and that any wa-
ter collected behind the dam belongs exclusively to the country
that collected it.6"
flooded-out by Lake Nassar, the agreement called for Sudan to hold a larger
share of water than it did before construction of the dam, leaving less water to
Egypt, which was now protected from drought by LakeNassar reserves. See
Vesi ind, supra note 7, at 66. The agreement, signed in 1959, did not contem-
plate formal allocation of a share of Nile water to any of the other upstream
riparians. It merely contemplated that if at some future date another upstream
riparian should claim its legitimate share of Nile River waters, Egypt and Sudan
would consult one another regarding such allocation at that time. To date, no
other upstream riparians have come forward to officially claim their shares as
entitled by international law. However, there certainly are upstreamriparians,
like Ethiopia, that need water. So it would seem to be only a matter of time
before a nation makes a claim, and the region then will face a new challenge to
the relative tranquility of the water-sharing arrangements that are in place to-
day. In fact, Ethiopia, which contributes 85% of the waters of the Nile, re-
cently has threatened to build its own dam on the Nile, upstream of both Su-
dan and Egypt. See id. For a more comprehensive history and analysis of the
Nile River valley and its water-sharing arrangements, see HILLEL, supra note 1,
at 111-42 and KLIOT, supra note 4, at 15-99.
62 See Lien, supra note 57, at 291-92; text accompanying supra note 59.
63 See MFA, supra note 59, at "The Water Dispute on the Ganges River
64 See id.
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Were absolute territorial sovereignty adopted as the basis for
water sharing in the Euphrates River Basin, Turkey would have
an uncontested say in the use of its waters." Then, Turkey could
decide how much water, if any, to release downstream to Syria
and, in turn, Iraq. These decisions would likely mean the differ-
ence between war and peace. In light of the regional animosity
between these three nations, it is hardly unimaginable that such
unmitigated power in the hands of one country would present a
dangerous situation.
3.1.2. Absolute Territorial Integrity
The doctrine of absolute territorial integrity is in some ways the
polar opposite of absolute territorial sovereignty. Under absolute
territorial integrity, a downstream riparian "may demand the con-
tinuation of the full flow of [water] from an upper riparian state,
free from any diminution in quantity or quality."" Presumably,
the Harmon Doctrine supercedes international law on the subject
of sharing water in a transboundary system, as it treats the problem
as a matter of the sovereignty of a nation-state." Absolute territo-
rial integrity is generally invoked by lower riparians on a river sys-
tem, and has indeed been invoked at various times by Iraq and
Syria.
Under absolute territorial integrity, Iraq, rather than Turkey,
would have the greatest say in use of the waters in the river basin.
It is unlikely that Iraq would allow Turkey to carry out its plans,
considering the massive reduction of water-flow into Iraq that the
GAP would cause. Whether Syria would be able to carry out its
plans on the Euphrates without reducing flow into Iraq beneath the
level that Iraq would tolerate is an open question. It is entirely pos-
sible that Iraq would not permit any development on the river that
would reduce flow across its border. This would, of course, result
in drastic under-utilization of the river.
65 Indeed, Turkey has relied on the Harmon Doctrine, or at least the con-
cept of absolute territorial sovereignty, in the past. In 1989, the Turks threat-
ened to hault completely the flow of the Euphrates to fill the Atatiirk Dam.
See Vesilind, supra note 7, at 49.
66 Aaron Schwabach, Diverting the Danube: The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dis.
puteandlnternationalFreshwaterLaw, 14 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 290,326 (1996).
67 See MFA, supra note 59, S II C.
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3.1.3. Limited Territorial Sovereignty
Many scholars now consider both of these doctrines to be prac-
tically untenable.68 Indeed, few scholars consider either of the doc-
trines as a feasible regime for transboundary water resource sharing.
This is largely due to the fact that69 the treaties and conventions
that have considered the subject have agreed at least on the notion
that no nation may simply commandeer the water in a trans-
boundary river for its own uses, leaving nothing whatsoever for the
downstream states.70
As a result, the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty was
developed. This doctrine provides that an upper riparian may use
transboundary river waters within its borders in any way it
chooses, so long as that use does not interfere with the "reasonable
utilization" of the waters of a downstream riparian."'
It is unclear what results the limited territorial sovereignty doc-
trine would produce in this region. What, for instance, does "rea-
sonable utilization" mean? In many ways, this system, often touted
as the great compromise, and the basis behind many of the treaties
and conventions in the field, marks a return to no system at all.
What criteria will Iraq, Turkey, and Syria use to determine which
uses are "reasonable?" Will they adopt those priorities that other
nations use to resolve their disputes? Iraq likely would claim that
its historical use of the rivers makes its present uses more "reason-
able" than those of Turkey and Syria. Syria, however, likely
would argue that Iraq's ability to use Tigris River waters in place of
any Euphrates waters that it might lose from Turkish and Syrian
irrigation projects makes its use seem less "reasonable."73 Like Iraq,
68 See Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 244-45.
69 Discussed more fully infra Section 3.2.
70 See Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of Interna-
tional Watercourses, G.A. Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 49,
at 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/229 (1997) [hereinafterU.N. Convention]; Helsinki
Rules on the Use of the Waters of International Rivers, art. IV, cmt. (a), 52 ILA
477, 486-87 (1966) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules]; Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Forty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10,ch. II, at 152.
71 See Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 245; Schwabach, supra note 66, at 327.
72 See MFA, supra note 59, § II B.
73 Indeed, some estimates suggest that by 2010 a shortage of water from the
Euphrates may occur, forcing Iraq to transfer water from the Tigris system to
the Euphrates. But these estimates suggest that this would be only a short-term
solution as the Tigris itself will likely suffer its own water shortage by 2025.
See SOFFER, supra note 12, at 105.
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Syria would also argue that it has "acquired rights" to water from
Turkey due to historical patterns of use.74 Turkey would likely ar-
gue that the agricultural uses that Syria and Iraq propose are ineffi-
cient and wasteful. Most of the water that comprises the Euphrates
and Tigris Rivers comes from Turkey, which, Turkey will argue,
gives it greater rights than the other riparians." Turkey further
would argue that the concept of "acquired rights" is not a valid
claim to superior water rights. 6 Daniel Hillel has summarized the
problem:
The issue in contention is how to weigh historical rights
against proportionate contributions to flow, taking into
consideration such associated factors as the real needs of
each country. Among those are the availability of energy
(e.g., petroleum); the need for hydroelectricity; the feasi-
bility of developing economic alternatives to irrigation-
based farming; the efficiency of water use; and the size of
each country's population.'
Placing these factors in order remains as intractable a concern
between the three riparians as it has been since the GAP was first
announced. Thus, this supposed solution at international law
seems no more useful than either absolute territorial integrity or
sovereignty.
3.1.4. Community Water Management
In lieu of those doctrines, some have advocated the use of a
community management theory: the idea that communal man-
agement of a transboundary water system is necessary to achieve its
optimal use. Those who support this idea have set forth three nec-
essary conditions for achieving a workable community manage-
ment system. They are:
4 See MFA, supra note 59, § II B.
75 See Tomanbay, supra note 43, 53-55.
76 See id.
77 HILLEL, supra note 1, at 102-03.
[Vol. 21:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol21/iss1/3
EUPHRATES RIVER BASIN WATER ISSUES
a) Developing and managing the water basin as a unit
without regard to international borders, ideally
through a joint transnational institutional structure;
b) Sharing the benefits of that development and
management according to an agreed formula or
procedure; and
c) Establishing a procedure for constructive investigation
and peaceful resolution of disputes.78
With these four doctrines in mind, I now turn to the more
significant international and bipartite treaties and agreements that
have been created in recent years.
3.2. International Agreements
3.2.1. The Helsinki Rules
In 1966, the International Law Association ("ILA") met to
create a document establishing rules of international law govern-
ing the use of transboundary watercourses. The ILA produced a
document that became known as the "Helsinki Rules on the Uses
of Waters of International Rivers." 9 The most salient points of
the Helsinki Rules were twofold. First, the rules adopted the
concept of limited territorial sovereignty by stating that a basin
state is entitled, "within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable
share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drain-
age basin."8" Again, the rule is limited by the fact that it fails to
specify what constitutes a "reasonable and equitable share" under
the doctrine. To that end, Article V of the Helsinki Rules deline-
ates the factors to be considered in determining what represents a
sovereign state's reasonable share."1 This list of factors includes
geography, hydrology, climate, past utilization, economic and so-
cial needs, population, cost of alternative means, availability of
other resources, avoidance of unnecessary waste, practicability of
compensation of other riparians, and harm caused to downstream
71 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Treaties as Instrumentsfor Managing Internaticn-
ally-Shared Water Resources: Restricted Sovereignty v. Community of Property, 26
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27, 52 (1994) [hereinafter Dellapenna, Treaties].
'9 Helsinki Rules, supra note 70.
Id. art. IV (emphasis added).
81 See id. art. V.
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riparians.82 Still, these rules fall short as many of the factors are
too highly subjective to have any practical value.
The Helsinki Rules, based as they are on the doctrine of lim-
ited sovereignty, have not proven useful, as such, in the Euphrates
Basin. They have, however, had two enduring effects on the gen-
eral situation. First, the Helsinki Rules, as a statement supporting
the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty, act as an interna-
tional agreement against the doctrines of absolute territorial sov-
ereignty and absolute territorial integrity."
The second important and enduring feature of the Helsinki
Rules is Article XXIX. Here, the Rules state that any riparian
planning to undertake a project that would alter the flow of a
transboundary water system should give prior notice to any
downstream riparian that may be affected."4 These two provi-
sions, and their later expressions in other treaties discussed below,
have served as the basis for claims that Turkey has violated and
continues to violate international law in the development of the
GAP. Though these provisions have far from settled the matter,
they do provide a background for the dispute.
3.2.2. ILC Draft Articles and The Watercourse Convention
In 1994, the International Law Commission ("ILC"), a U.N.
commission established in 1947 for the codification of interna-
tional law, published at its forty-sixth session, a set of thirty-three
draft articles on the law of the non-navigational uses of interna-
tional watercourses ("Draft Articles")." Given the nature of the
ILC as an objective codification body, it was not clear whether
these Draft Articles were a simple codification or an attempt at
progressive development. 6
82 See id.
83 Lien, supra note 57, at 295.
s Helsinki Rules, supra note 70, art. XXIX.
85 See Reaz Rahman, The Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses: Dilemma for Lower Riparians, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 9, 12
(1995).
"' See id. at 14. The question of codification versus progressive develop-
ment is, perhaps, a bit misleading. There are various definitions of "codifica-
tion." "Scientific codification" envisions a task of "ascertaining" and "declar-
ing" existing international law. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 66-67 (1991). At the same time, however,
codification often includes filling in gaps and removing inconsistencies. See id.
at 71. To the extent that these become significant, they often take on the char-
acter of progressive development.
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In May of 1997, the United Nations General Assembly
adopted the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational
Uses of International Watercourses (" Convention").87 Essentially,
this is a revision of the Draft Articles. The Convention was
adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 103 in favor, and 3
against, with a high number of abstentions (26). It should also be
noted that of the 103 votes in favor, 18 (or nearly 20%) of those
nations are unaffected parties, in that they are insular states con-
taining no transboundary watercourses."8 The three votes against
the Convention were, significantly, Burundi, China, and Turkey,
all three of which are upper riparian states. As Turkey did not
sign the Convention, it is not bound by it. 9
The most significant articles of the Convention are fourfold.
First, Article 3, Sections 3 and 490 allow watercourse states to en-
ter into 'watercourse agreements' with other watercourse states
that amend or otherwise change the provisions of the Convention
to suit the particular political, social or geographical needs of the
given watercourse or region. 1 In reality, this is both a strength
and a weakness of the Convention. The provision does give wa-
tercourse states the flexibility to use the Convention as a blue-
print from which a bilateral or multilateral treaty suited to the
political and demographic realities of the particular regions can be
formulated. However, it also tends to dilute the force of the
87 U.N. Convention, supra note 70.
88 See Aaron Schwabach, The United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Customary International Law,
and the Interests of Developing Upper Riparians, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 257, 262
(1998) [hereinafter, Schwabach, U.N. Convention].
89 See id. In fact, the existence of the Convention, and Turkey's refusal to
sign it, actually add strength to a claim that it is not bound by the developing
agreement on principles of international law on transboundary waterways em-
bodied in the Convention. As discussed in more detail below, international law
is generally formed through treaty, custom and general principles. See
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE [I.C.J.], June 16, 1945,
art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060. Since a country must accept a treaty or custom in
order for it to be bound by that treaty or custom, see id., Turkey's express re-
jection of the Convention demonstrates its lack of acceptance of the principles
embodied therein whether found in treaty or customary international law.
Thus, Turkey has strengthened its position as unbound by existing principles of
international law that might otherwise be applicable.
o Article 3 states, "Watercourse States may enter into one or more agree-
ments ... which apply and adjust the provisions of the p resent Convention to
the characteristics and uses of a particular international watercourse or part
thereof." U.N. Convention, supra note 70, art. 3 S 3.
91 See id.
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Convention and to give nations an easy way to virtually ignore its
provisions. In short, nations can simply "contract around" the
Convention. Indeed, several states voting in favor of the Conven-
tion voiced dissatisfaction with the ambiguity of Article 3, and
expressed their right to enter into separate agreements which
would supercede the provisions of the Convention.92 India went
as far as to say that Article 3 undermined the applicability of the
Convention. 9
Second, Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention are substantially
revised from the Draft Articles, apparently in an attempt to rec-
tify an imbalance in the Draft Articles in favor of lower riparians.
These three articles contain two major provisions that are the cen-
terpiece of the international law on non-navigational uses of
transboundary waterways, and are the most common source of
contention: "equitable utilization" and "no significant harm."
Article 5 states that "Watercourse States shall in their respective
territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and
reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse
shall be used and developed by watercourse states with a view to
attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits
therefrom .... .""4 Next, as dictated by the Helsinki Rules, Arti-
cle 6 of the Convention sets out the factors that are to be consid-
ered in determining what is "equitable utilization." These include
geography, hydrology, climate, social and economic needs of wa-
tercourse states involved, population of watercourse states, effects
of use by one state on another, existing and potential uses of the
watercourse, conservation, and availability of alternatives of com-
parable value to a particular planned or existing use." Of particu-
lar importance, the factor "population dependent on the water-
course in each watercourse State""' was included in the Helsinki
Rules, omitted from the Draft Articles, and now included in the
Convention."
92 See Schwabach, UN Convention, supra note 88, at 268-69.
See Transcript of the Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses
of International Watercourses, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 99th plen. mtg., at 10,
U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.99 (1997) [hereinafter Transcript].
9' U.N. Convention, supra note 70, art. 5.
91 See id. art. 6.
96 Id.
' Schwabach, U.N Convention, supra note 88, at 272.
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Article 7 of the Convention adds the precarious doctrine of
"no significant harm." The Draft Articles contained a similar
concept, no appreciable harm.98 Such doctrines clearly benefit
upper riparian states, but remain a weakness of international law
because they remain ambiguous. Article 7 reads as follows:
1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international
watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate meas-
ures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other
watercourse States. 2. Where significant harm neverthe-
less is caused to another watercourse State, the States
whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agree-
ment to such use, take all appropriate measures, having
due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consul-
tation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such
harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of
compensation.9
Articles 5, 6 and 7 have drawn significant, broad-based criti-
cism from members of the Convention." States voting for and
against the Convention, as well as those abstaining, voiced reser-
vations."' In particular, many expressed concern over the ambi-
guity of the articles when read together. It was unclear, they said,
whether the controlling concept was "reasonable use" or "no sig-
nificant harm." 2 Additionally, the meaning of "no significant
harm" is also unclear. Since the Draft Articles, which helped
form the Convention, state the principal as "no appreciable
harm," harm likely must be more than simply noticeable. The
Convention, however, offers no guidance as to how great the
harm can be before it is considered significant. Furthermore, it
does not specify how riparian states should interpret the juxtapo-
sition of "no significant harm" with "reasonable use." For exam-
ple, if the GAP causes significant harm to Syria and Iraq, as it al-
most surely does, can Turkey offer justification by claiming that
it is nevertheless an equitable and reasonable use based on the
98 See Rahman, supra note 85, at 23.
9 U.N. Convention, supra note 70, art. 7.
100 See Transcript, supra note 93.
101 See Schwabach, U.N. Convention, supra note 88, at 271-72.
102 Id.
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needs of its own population? To a certain degree, this question
about the Euphrates River is academic since Turkey voted against
the Convention. Academic or not, however, this discussion illus-
trates one of the primary deficiencies of international law as it ex-
ists in the Convention: overall lack of clarity. This lack of clarity,
in turn, contributes to the weakness of international law. Where
the Convention is vague, nations remain unclear on how to fol-
low it. Where nations find that a principle or convention of in-
ternational law lacks clarity, many scholars consider it to lack le-
gitimacy, or at least lack strength. 3 Professor Thomas Franck,
for instance, points to four factors that contribute to the legiti-
macy of an international law: "determinacy" (clarity of the rule);
"symbolic validation" (legitimacy/authority of the rules origins);
"coherence" (consistency of the rule); and "adherence" (whether
there is a body of secondary rules that assist in interpretation of
the primary rule)."°4 According to Franck, to the extent a rule of
international law lacks these factors, it will be easier for nations to
ignore the rule."'
Certainly the Convention as written lacks determinacy."' As
previously discussed, it is also not clear which of "no significant
harm" or "reasonable use" in the Convention should take prece-
dence. It is not clear what constitutes significant harm. Nor is it
clear what constitutes "reasonable use," or how the various fac-
tors listed should be weighted. It therefore lacks "adherence."
There is no infrastructure of secondary law that helps nations in-
terpret the central questions I have already raised. One might also
argue that the Convention lacks "coherence"- the very conflict
between "reasonable use" and "no significant harm" makes the
Convention inconsistent. Indeed, many nations that participated
103 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG
NATIONS 24, 25 (1990); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in Interna-
tional Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 414-15 (1983).
104 See FRANCK, supra note 103, at 49.
105 See id.
106 While this may or may not undermine the strength of the law, it is ar-
gued that vagueness does not make the law any less "law." See Louis HENKIN,
How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 95 (2d ed. 1979); Weil,
supra note 103, at 415. However, while it may not undermine its status as law,
per se, it certainly weakens its force and enforceability. See id.
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in the Convention expressed a desire for greater clarity on the
juxtaposition of these two principles."
Thus, one obstacle facing use of international law in the Eu-
phrates River Basin is its lack of what Franck would call "legiti-
macy." "8 What law exists is what he calls "soft law."0 9 If inter-
national law is to be useful in the Euphrates River Basin conflict,
it must be made more clear and unambiguous. Certainly, this is
going to be very difficult given the political nature of the relation-
ships between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. It is for this reason that
some sort of political agreement must be reached between the
three nations before international law can be more than a starting
point.
Third, Articles 11 through 17 continue the pattern of requir-
ing notification for planned measures on an international water-
course."' Essentially these provisions expand the notification
concept introduced in the Helsinki Rules and preserved in the
Draft Articles. Very few states objected to the adoption of the
Draft Articles, which included those that ultimately abstained or
voted against the Convention.11' States' general acceptance makes
the notification doctrine, at least its general theory, one of the few
practically applicable, non-controversial, and widely followed
practices of international law regarding non-navigational uses of
transboundary watercourses.
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, Article 33 describes
a method for dispute resolution."' First, Article 33 requires nego-
tiation between watercourse states in conflict.' If negotiation
does not settle the matter, the parties may then seek mediation by
a third party."' If after six months no settlement is reached, Arti-
cle 33 allows the parties to establish a Fact-Finding Commission
comprised of one nominee from each concerned state and a final
member chosen by the nominees."5 Concerned parties must pro-
10 See Schwabach, UN Convention, supra note 88, at 275 (noting that
many nations generally objected to the ambiguity of the Convention).
0 FRANCK, supra note 103, at 16-19.
109 Id. at 29.
110 See U.N. Convention, supra note 70, arts. 11-17.
m See Schwabach, U.N. Convention, supra note 88, at 274.
11. See U.N. Convention, supra note 70, art. 33.
113 See id. art. 33 S 2.
114 See id.
115 See id. art. 33 S 3, 4.
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vide the Commission with any information it might require as
well as access to the territory of any states involved.116 Finally,
the Commission must submit its findings in a report, "which the
Parties concerned shall consider in good faith.""'7 Many states ob-
jected to this article. Some advocated for a more effective provi-
sion, While others, like China, expressed no objection to "fact-
finding" per se, but refused to submit to a settlement dispute pro-
vision that could in any way compel a sovereign state to act.
118
Having discussed the past and present state of international
law regarding non-navigational uses of international courses this
Comment now considers the various disputes that have arisen
among the riparians in the Euphrates River Basin within that con-
text.
3.3. Arguments of the Riparians
3.3.1. Iraq
Iraq is the most vulnerable of the riparians in the Euphrates
River Basin for several reasons.1 9 First, Iraq is the furthest down-
stream and, therefore, has little control over how much flow it
receives from the Euphrates, or the quality of the water it does re-
ceive. Any Euphrates River project undertaken by Syria or Tur-
key has a direct effect on Iraq's water supply. Second, Iraq's bar-
gaining position within the region has been weakened by its
recent confrontations with the United Nations and the United
States. Though from a military standpoint Iraq was perhaps the
most powerful nation in the Middle East in the late 1980s, it has
fallen in stature as a result of the Gulf War and the military ac-
tions taken against it by the United States and Great Britain in
late 1998. Thus Iraq has lost a great deal of its military leverage."
Iraq justifies its use of the Euphrates River with two argu-
ments. First, based upon the legal doctrine of absolute territorial
integrity, Iraq argues that the waters that flow through its borders
are its sovereign possession, and that it therefore has the right to
116 See id. art. 33 § 7.
117 Id. art. 33 9 8.
118 See Schwabach, U.N. Convention, supra note 88, at 274-75.
119 See HILLEL, supra note 1, at 102.
120 See Frey, supra note 6, at 29.
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do with them as it pleases. Iraq notes that countries as preva-
lent in the system of international law as the United States have
relied on this doctrine when they were developing countries, and
abandon it only when they are in a position to be more mag-
nanimous."2 Second, Iraq claims it possesses "acquired rights"
from two sources. Iraq points to the fact that Mesopotamian civi-
lization first started using the Euphrates waters for irrigation
thousands of years ago in the area that is presently Iraq."23 There-
fore, claims Iraq, this prior use should take precedent, and no up-
stream riparian should be entitled to take away the water that has
been used by the Iraqi people for thousands of years. Iraq also ar-
gues that its irrigation structures, which preexisted either Tur-
key's or Syria's development of the Euphrates, should act as a
baseline. In short, Iraq argues that flow from the river ought not
to be reduced below the level necessary to support these pre-
existing irrigation installations.2
One interesting possibility that has remained largely unex-
plored is whether Iraq's prior usage of the Euphrates and Tigris
waters and, more importantly, Turkey and Syria's historical ac-
quiescence to Iraq's use, constitutes a regional custom. As ex-
plained previously, international law can be created through cus-
tom. Custom can be found on a world-wide level or a regional
level. Regional customs create regional customary international
law. Further, unless a country "unambiguously and persistently"
registers its objection to a custom while that custom is in its de-
velopment stage, that country will be said to have accepted that
regional custom and therefore be bound by it."2 Iraq could argue
that Turkey and Syria have demonstrated acceptance of the cus-
tomary distribution of Euphrates and Tigris River waters as they
121 See MFA, supra note 59, S II A.
2 See text accompanying supra note 59.
1 See Adai Hardan, Sharing the Euphrates: Iraq, RES. & EXPLORATION,
Nov. 1993, at 73; MFA, supra note 59, S II A; see generally text accompanying
supra note 49.
124 See id. § ]I A.
12' See Humphrey Waldock, General Course on Public International Law,
in RECUEIL DES CouRS 5, 49-53 (Academie De Driot International ed., 2d ed.,
1962; see generally Haya de la Torre Case (Colo. v. Peru), 1950 I.CJ. 266 (hold-
ing that the Colombian government proved the existence of such a custom, but,
even if such custom did exist between certain Latin American countries, that
the custom could not be invoked against Peru, which repudiated it) [hereinafter
Asylum Case].
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have allowed Iraq to take its water without objection for hun-
dreds of years.
Once a country has accepted a custom it is bound by that cus-
tom. Even if a country sporadically deviates from the custom, as
long as those deviations do not indicate a lack of acceptance of the
custom by the given nation, it will be presumed to accept the cus-
tom.12' Thus, Iraq could argue that Turkey and Syria have dem-
onstrated their acceptance of the regional custom and that they
are now bound by it. Turkey and Syria likely would accept the
notion that a country that accepts a custom is bound by that cus-
tom. However, they also would likely point out that a country
not only must accept such a custom, but it must adhere to the cus-
tom because it has accepted it as law, not simply out of coinci-
dence or convenience. This is the notion of opiniojuris.2 7 Thus,
Turkey and Syria would argue that they have allowed Iraq to use
the bulk of the Tigris and Euphrates flow because they have not,
until recently, felt any desire to harness those rivers themselves,
not because they felt any legal obligation not to do so. The reso-
lution of this question would hinge on a historical analysis of
Iraq's use of the waters and Turkey's acceptance thereof, which is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
Iraq argues that, from the standpoint of the existing, interna-
tional law conventions, Turkey has violated international law in
several respects. First, in 1990, Turkey almost entirely cut off the
flow of the Euphrates River in order to fill up the reservoir at the
Atatiirk Dam. Iraq claims that this was done without proper no-
tification as required by the Helsinki Rules (and later codified in
the Draft Articles and the Convention). This argument is tenu-
ous, however, since it seems clear that Turkey did give notice
through its increase of the normal flow of the Euphrates into
Syria for several months in advance of the filling of the reser-
voir.128 However, despite this attempt at compensation by Tur-
key, the almost total cut-off of Euphrates River flow for more
than a month did cause significant harm to Iraq in the form of
crop loss, which might rise to the level sufficient to constitute a
violation of the rules intended by the Convention. Iraq further
126 See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (une 27) (discussing whether the United States violated customary law
by using military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua).
127 See Waldock, supra note 125, at 45-49.
128 See Vesilind, supra note 7, at 49-50.
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argues that, in accordance with the Convention, factors such as its
climate, social need, effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in
one state on other states, and existing uses of the watercourse fa-
vor its argument that the GAP, as planned, is not a "reasonable
use" of the Euphrates.
129
3.3.2. Syria
Syria argues from a weak position in the Euphrates River Sys-
tem discussions because it is both an upstream riparian with re-
spect to Iraq, and a downstream riparian with respect to Turkey.
Its arguments, therefore, have been predictably inconsistent. Re-
cently, however, Syria has begun to align itself more closely with
Iraq in a united front against Turkey, requesting that the ILC cod-
ify a final form of the Draft Articles, which it did by way of the
Convention.13 Many believe that this alignment of Syria with
Iraq against Turkey is the natural position for Syria, and was only
a matter of time to become that, due to Syria's historical resent-
ment of Iraq."'
Syria, like Iraq, points to the doctrines of ancient rights and
reasonable use/significant harm to claim that Turkey is in viola-
tion of international law. Syrians believe that the water of the
Euphrates is for the people who live on its banks, and is not to be
harnessed exclusively by upstream riparians 32 In the end, both
Syria and Iraq voted in favor of the Convention.33
3.3.3. Turkey
Turkey responds to the claims that the GAP is not a "reason-
able use" under the Convention by pointing to several factors that
129 See MFA, supra note 59, S 1- B.
13' See id. As further evidence that Iraq and Syria have adopted a position
of mutual cooperation and a unified front against Turkey, in April of 1990, Iraq
and Syria signed an agreement in which Syria agreed to send Iraq 58% of any
water that comes down the Euphrates from Turkey. See U.N. Convention, su-
pra note 70.
131 See ASSOCIATES FOR MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH WATER PROJECT,
WATER ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SYRIA: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND
STRATEGIC 117 (1989) [hereinafter AMER: SYRIA]. In fact, the Turkish- Syr-
ian border has not always been where it is now, and many Syrians believe that
the GAP project is a means by which Turkey hopes to solidify its illegitimate
control of ancient Syrian land.
132 See id.
133 See Transcript, supra note 93.
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are enumerated in Article 6, including hydrological factors, social
and economic need, population dependence on the watercourse,
and availability of alternative uses of comparable value. 134 Fur-
thermore, Turkey rejects the notion of ancient acquired rights as
controlling, suggesting instead that this is but one element among
many that should be used to consider whether a planned use for a
transboundary river system is equitable.
13 1
Still, Turkey has not taken the position that it can do what-
ever it wants with the river, regardless of the effect on down-
stream riparians, though it is not clear whether this is due to be-
lief in limited territorial sovereignty, or simply to political
expediency, as described below. In any event, in 1987, Turkey
signed an agreement promising to deliver at least 500 m3 per sec-
ond down the Euphrates annually into Syria.136 Both Iraq and
Syria have since requested that this figure be increased, but so far
Turkey has refusedV
37
4. STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
4.1. Sovereignty
One of the most enduring features of international law is its
reliance on the concept of the sovereignty of the nation-state.13
134 See KLIOT, supra note 4, at 160-65; Tomanbay, supra note 43, at 59-60;
MFA, supra note 59, S II C.
135 See id.
136 See KLIOT, supra note 4, at 162.
137 See id. at 163-64 (noting that Syria and Iraq have asked for a constant
flow of 700 m3 per second).
131 See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7), 2
Hudson, World Ct. Rep. 20, at 35. The S.S. Lotus case coined one of the most
famous phrases in international law, at least as regards the sanctity of sover-
eignty of nations in international law: "Restrictions on the independence of
States cannot therefore be presumed."
The case involved a jurisdictional dispute between France and Turkey. Af-
ter a collision on the high-seas between French and Turkish vessels, which re-
sulted in the death of several Turkish citizens, the French ship docked in Con-
stantinople. Once on Turkish soil, the Turks arrested the French officer of the
watch and prosecuted him for criminal negligence. The French protested,
claiming that Turkey did not have jurisdiction to prosecute a French citizen for
an incident that happened on the high-seas while the officer was on a French-
flagged vessel. In essence, the French claimed that since there was no point in
international law giving Turkey such jurisdiction, Turkey had none to assert.
The Permanent Court of International Justice, however, determined that to
block Turkey from exercising jurisdiction, France had to find a principle of in-
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Very few, if any, conventions of international law contain formal-
ized provisions for enforcement of the law. This is why the seem-
ingly toothless provisions for dispute resolution found in Article
33 of the Convention are considered by some to be quite draco-
nian.139 Out of this basic premise of sovereignty in international
law, the two apparently opposing legal doctrines of absolute terri-
torial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity are almost in-
tuitive. It is these two doctrines that characterize the tension in
international law of watercourses."4
Yet the doctrines are not as different as they seem at first
glance. Though they are often considered polar opposites, they
are both expressions of the adherence of international law to the
sovereignty of nations. 141 Absolute territorial sovereignty means
that a nation can do whatever it wishes with the waters that are
within its borders. 42 There is not much difference between this
notion and that of absolute territorial integrity, its so-called polar
opposite. Absolute territorial integrity also holds that a nation
can do whatever it wants with the waters within its borders, and
no nation can do anything to interrupt the normal flow of water
over which a nation is sovereign." At least in part, international
law stumbles here because it tries to apply itself to an arbitration
of two legitimate claims of sovereignty. It is ill-equipped to do
this because it has at its core a belief in the sanctity of the sover-
eignty of the nation-state.
This tension bears itself out not only in the basic doctrines of
the international law of transboundary watercourses, but also in
written conventions. Many consider the Convention" to be a
formalized and codified expression of the doctrine of limited ter-
ritorial integrity.4 This can be seen in the tension between the
competing concepts of "equitable and reasonable "  use and "no
ternational law forbidding Turkey's exercise. In short, the court held that what
international law does not forbid, it allows. See id.
... See Schwabach, U.N. Convention, supra note 88, at 274.
140 See id. at 276.
141 See id.
142 See id.
143 See id.
141 See U.N. Convention, supra note 70.
145 See, e.g., Schwabach, U.N. Convention, supra note 88, at 277.
146 See U.N. Convention, supra note 70, art. 5.
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significant harm" 47 found in the Convention.148 The question,
then, is simply to decide where along the scale between the two
doctrines, and their respective conceptual counterparts, interna-
tional law will fall.'49 But again, as discussed above, international
law is ill-equipped, due to its conceptual underpinnings, to choose
between these two equally valid expressions of the same sacred
notion of nation-state sovereignty.
One possible solution might be for international law to ap-
proach the problem by avoiding the nation-state soveriegnty issue
as much as possible. A legal regime that thinks of the law in
terms of something other than the nation-state as principle actor
could be better suited to tackle the problems involved in finding a
coherent and workable blueprint for the law of transboundary
waterways. This may be one reason, in addition to the obvious
one that the Euphrates River is located in the Middle East, why
some scholars have examined the potential of Islamic law, with its
focus on individual spiritual belief, to solve these problems."1
Public international law's belief in nation-state sovereignty
creates an obstacle for itself in one other important respect. This
belief causes difficulty in international law enforcement of any
compulsion on a nation-state. Public international law is devel-
oped primarily by custom, which is defined as a "consistent pat-
tern of behavior joined with the sense that the practice is legally
obligatory."' Nations act in a given way, adhering to certain
norms and practices, and these norms in turn become custom and,
thus, public international law.'52 Usually, as is the case in envi-
ronmental law, the basic concept of what is attempted is a goal
that all parties involved eventually favor. Although it is certain
that developing countries favor different levels of environmental
restrictions than do developed nations, all nations eventually want
to see clean air and waterways. Hence, public international law's
147 See id. art 7.
148 See Schwabach, U.N Convention, supra note 88, at 277.
149 See id. at 276.
150 See David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public Interna.
tional Law: Separate Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'LL. 819 (1993).
This concept is also the likely impetus for scholars likeDellapenna to look to
water resource management cooperatives as a potential solution to trans-
boundary waterway issues. See Dellapenna, supra note 8.
151 Id.
152 See Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 23941.
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reluctance and/or inability to compel nations is ultimately not a
crucial issue, as compliance will follow from self-interest.
With the law of transboundary waterways, this is not the case.
Interests between upper and lower riparians are not necessarily
similar. After all, while lower riparians and neutral parties have
an interest in equitable sharing of a transboundary waterway, up-
per riparians have little self-interest that would militate towards
this position."5 3 Ultimately, water rich upper riparians have no
reason to self-enforce norms of public international law in this
arena, and they resist any compelled compliance. It was no sur-
prise that the countries that objected to the quasi-compelling as-
pects of Article 33 of the Convention were almost all primarily
upper riparians.' 4
4.2. Applying Public International Law to Situations Involving
the Survival of Nation-States.
Finally, it is less than clear whether public international law,
as it is currently constructed, was ever intended, or is even
equipped, to handle a crisis of this type. Generally, public inter-
national law is based on the consent of the nation-states over
which it governs.' It is for this reason that public international
law recognizes that a principle does not become a rule of interna-
tional law unless it has been "accepted" by the international
community. 6 There are three primary ways by which interna-
tional law is created: custom, international agreement (treaties and
conventions), and "general principles.""' A country can be
153 One notable exception can apply when a state is an upper riparian with
respect to one significant transboundary river system but the downstream ri-
parian with respect to another. Syria is an example of such a state. Another
possible source of self-interest is the interest a state has in peaceful relations
with its neighbors. In a region like the Middle East, where tensions between
neighbors often run high, its source of self-interest is often reduced.
154 See Transcript, supra note 93.
.55 See Asylum Case, supra note 125; SCHACHTER, supra note 86, at 36;
WALDOCK, supra note 125, at 50.
156 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §102(l) (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Indeed, other sources providing guidance on
rulemaking in international law recognize writings by scholars, academics and
other "publicists" as sources of international law, but these writings have been
widely recognized as evidence of international law rather than as independent
sources of law themselves. See Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 89, art. 38 5 1(d);
see, e.g., S.S. Lotus, supra note 138.
157 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 156, § 102(1)(a)-(c).
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viewed as accepting an international legal custom through its fail-
ure to demonstrate its opposition to the custom. Thus, a nation
need only demonstrate its opposition to ensure that it is not
bound by that custom as a matter of international law."15
Given this requirement for consent and the notion that the
consent of a nation-state adopting a particular rule of interna-
tional law depends on that nation's self-interest, broadly defined,
it seems unlikely that a state would adhere to any rule of interna-
tional law if its very survival were at stake. Nor would a nation
accept a rule of international law that compromised its sover-
eignty, the very foundation on which international law is built.
' See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Asylum Case,supra note 125;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 156. During the developmental stage of a customary
rule of international law, a state that consistently voices its opposition to that
custom will not be bound by it, even though the custom nevertheless becomes a
rule of international law through its acceptance by other nations in the world
or the region. If, however, a country does not actively voice its opposition to
the custom during its developmental stage, the country then is considered to
have consented to the custom and will be held responsible for abiding by the
rule that emerges. See RESTATEMENT, supra, note 156; WALDOCK, supra, note
125. It is generally accepted that nation-states behave according to their respec-
tive self-interests. Thus, if a particular custom or treaty seems to be in a na-
tion's self-interest it will consent to it. Once the nation-state has consented to a
custom or a treaty, it becomes a rule of international law, at least as applied to
that nation. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 156.
The concept of enforcement of an international law is also somewhat com-
plex. Though it may have been in a nation's best interest to consent to a cus-
tom or a treaty at the time that it consented, circumstances change, and a coun-
try may find itself no longer wishing to abide by an international law it
previously accepted. There is little in the way of "vertical enforcement" to
compel a nation to abide by an international law. See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW
OF NATIONS 100-102 (6th ed. 1963). "Vertical enforcement" might be seen as
the equivalent of the police in the United States. Thus, one may question
whether public international law is law at all if it cannot be enforced.
The responses to this questioning have fallen into two main categories.
First, some scholars respond- by claiming that while international law may lack
mechanisms of "vertical enforcement, the international community of nations
does have a kind of "horizontal enforcement" to compel compliance with in-
ternational law. This "horizontal enforcement" can be seen as a kind of incen-
tive-creating force between nations to comply with international law. A nation
that does not abide by its agreements and violates clearly established and long-
held norms of international behavior will quickly find that it suffers from vari-
ous "extra-legal" consequences vis-a-vis other nations in the international com-
munity. See FRANCK, supra note 103, at 24; HENKIN, supra note 106, at 92-98.
Second, other scholars have made the somewhat practical point that how inter-
national law is or is not enforced is highly irrelevant, given that most nations
tend to obey clearly and properly established rules of international law. See id.
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Indeed, when asked about the United States' actions towards
Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Dean Acheson responded:
I must conclude that the propriety of the Cuban quaran-
tine is not a legal issue. The power, position and prestige
of the United States had been challenged by another state;
and law simply does not deal with such questions of ulti-
mate power- power that comes close to the sources of
sovereignty. I cannot believe that there are principles of
law that say we must accept destruction of our way of
life.159
If international law is a system built on consent of nations to
be governed, essentially to cede aspects of their sovereignty, then
international law is hard-pressed to apply to a situation where the
very survival of nations is in question. Such is clearly the case in
the water crisis among Turkey, Syria and Iraq.
5. POLITICAL FACTORS
5.1. The Peace Pipeline
One of the common mistakes of scholars studying the water
crisis in the Middle East, and looking for a solution, is a tendency
to analyze the problem without reference to the political realities
of the region. A good example of this is the "Peace Pipeline."
160
The Peace Pipeline was an idea originally conceived as a massive
dual pipeline sending large quantities of water down from Turkey
(likely from storage in the reservoir of the Atatiirk Dam), south
through Syria and into southwestern Saudi Arabia at Mecca on
the western branch and Bahrain on the eastern branch.
161
This proposal originally generated quite a bit of interest be-
cause it solved many problems. Water that would not suffer from
the quality degradation problems associated with irrigation runoff
from Turkey and Syria could be delivered downstream. Syria,
and perhaps also Iraq, could be guaranteed a certain amount of
5 9 Dean Acheson, Remarks (Apr. 25, 1963), in Quincy Wright, The Cuban
Quarantine, 1963 AM. SOC'Y INT'L. PROC. 13, 14 (1963).
160 See Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 233-35.
161 See id.; KLIOT, supra note 4, at 132-33.
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water on a regular basis and Turkey could make a profit from the
water it shipped to the lower Middle East. 62 For some time,
many thought that a solution to the water crisis had been found.
Yet this plan did not take into account the political signifi-
cance of the water, the river, and the land to a country, particu-
larly an Islamic country. To Syria, which would have to go along
with any form of the Peace Pipeline plan, 163 accepting the Peace
Pipeline concept meant giving up the Euphrates River as a source
of water. In effect, Syria would have to abdicate control of the
Euphrates and of certain amounts of annual flow, in return for
water from Turkey down the pipeline. But this meant more to
Syria and Iraq, than just giving up the water from the river. To
these nations, largely due to their Islamic roots, giving up the wa-
ter flow of the Euphrates meant giving up the land beneath the
river, which constituted relinquishing some of the basic sover-
eignty of the nation itself.'" In the end, this was a major factor in
derailing plans for a Peace Pipeline.1 61 At this point, the idea of
such a pipeline is practically dead.
1 66
Several other political factors have combined to make any po-
litical agreement between the three riparians impossible. Without
162 See KLIOT, supra note 4, at 133. The issue of Turkish income generation
through the sale of water touches on another factor that tends to inform the
positions of the three riparians. Of Turkey, Syria and Iraq, Turkey is the only
nation that is considered "water rich." Turkey gets an annual rainfall of be-
tween two and four thousand cubic meters, while Iraq and Syria each receive
far less than two thousand cubic meters per year. See Anthony R. de Souza, Re-
flections on an Elusive Resource, RES. & EXPLORATION, Nov. 1993, at 3-6. Of
course, as is the central issue of this Comment, Turkey also benefits from its
position as an upper riparian with respect to many different river systems,
while Syria and Iraq are generally down-stream riparians. Thus, Turkey is
really the only one of the three countries with water to burn, or sell, as the case
may be. On the contrary, however, while Turkey is water rich and Iraq and
Syria water poor, Turkey is the only country of the three that is not blessed
with a vast oil reserve. This factor likely has led to a feeling on the part of
Turkey that water is one of the few natural resources that it has in surplus, and
to a desire to use this fact to its advantage.
163 See KLIOT, supra note 4, at 132.
164 See AMER: SYRIA, supra note 131, at 125.
165 This points to the ever-present political calculus that complicates mat-
ters in the region. Syria has long distrusted Turkey, seeing it as a potential
hegemonic power in the region. Indeed, Syria has often claimed that the Peace
Pipeline is little more than a scheme on Turkey's part to make Syria, Iraq and
other Arab countries dependent on Turkey for water and, thus, economically
and politically dominated by Turkey. See MFA, supra note 50, § II B.
166 See Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 234.
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political agreement first, it is unlikely that international law will
be able to function in the region."
5.2. The Kurdish Situation
Political considerations shape Turkey's position regarding
sharing the Euphrates waters. Compelling Turkey toward a
tougher stance is its concern about the Kurdish minority in
southeast Turkey. 6 This politically rebellious faction of Turkish
society is a significant minority in the Southeast Anatolia region
and Turkey hopes to use the GAP, and the prosperity it hopes it
will bring to the region, as a stabilizing'mechanism. 69 In addi-
tion, Turkey is not blind to the power position it has in the re-
gion. The fact that Iraq's army is in disarray and is probably in
no position to challenge Turkey militarily, combined with Tur-
key's position as the upper riparian, gives Turkey almost total
control of the situation. Thus, temptation is high for Turkey to
use water as a political club to hold over its downstream neigh-
bors. For instance, Turkey recently indicated that it would con-
nect water issues to Syria's acquiescence to Turkish demands not
to support the rebel Kurdish Workers Party ("PKK"), the Kurd-
ish separatist faction in southern Turkey and northern Syria. 7
167 See Thomas Naff, Water: That Peculiar Substance, RES. &
EXPLORATION, Nov. 1993, at 7, 12.
168 Today, there are more than 20 million ethnic Kurds in Turkey, many of
whom live in southern Anatolia, the GAP region. The Kurds have historically
been persecuted by the Turkish government and the Kurds both in Turkey and
across Europe have long-called for an independent Kurdish state. The Turkish
government has killed many Kurds and burned many Kurdish villages in re-
sponse to Kurdish rebel movements in Turkey. See Stephen Kinzer, Kurds' Re-
bel Leader May Prove a Discredit to His Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at A6.
The Kurds actually were promised their own state in the Treaty of Sevres in
1920, but this never came to pass. Today, the Kurds are not recognized in Tur-
key as a minority, and Kurdish language is illegal in"broadcasts, educational or
political settings." See Alessandra Stanley, Top Kurd's Arrest Unleasbes Rioting
AllAcross Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at Al.
169 See Tomonbay, supra note 43, at 56-58.
10 Turkey had suspected Syria of harboring Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the
PKK, and long-time re el scourge of Turkey. See Stephen Kinzer, In Snatching a
Fugitive Rebel, Ankara Wins Opportunities on Several Fronts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 1999, at A6. In fact, Syria had harbored Ocalan for 18 years and had given
significant financial support to Ocalan's PKK in the past as well. See id. In its
recent capture of Ocafan, however, Turkey significantly pressured Syria, caus-
ing it to expel Ocalan and cooperate in his capture. See Stanley, supra note 168,
at A6.
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At the same time, however, Turkey is extremely interested in
joining the community of western nations and the European Un-
ion."'1 As such, it feels pressure to act as a "good neighbor" and
not to be seen as a rogue state acting in violation of international
law. 72 These conflicting political realities have made it difficult
for Turkey to work toward a political settlement and have often
led to inconsistent Turkish statements of policy and actions." 3
In Syria, the politics regarding water are dominated by the fact
that Syria is a participating riparian in no less than three separate
river systems involving many countries. First, Syria shares the
Euphrates Basin with Turkey and Iraq."7 Second, it does not
have exclusive rights to the Orontes River Basin, which flows
southward from Lebanon, moves into Syria, and ends up in Tur-
key before dumping into the sea."'5 Lastly, Syria shares with Jor-
dan the Yarmuk River Basin, a tributary of the Jordan River,
which itself is shared by many countries, including Israel." 6
It is important to note that Syria is somewhat of a middle-man
in all of these river systems because it is both an upstream and a
downstream riparian relative to different countries. As the man
in the middle, Syria cannot judge the concerns over one river sys-
tem in isolation. Any decisions or agreements it makes with
Turkey or Iraq over the use of the Euphrates has ramifications in
its dealings with Jordan, Lebanon, or Israel regarding the Orontes
and the Yarmuk Rivers. For this reason, the situation in Syria is
interesting. Unlike Turkey, which is primarily an upper riparian,
Syria is compelled by its own interests to seek a solution at inter-
national law that is equitable to both upstream and downstream
riparians 7 Thus, it is through Syria that the conflict over the
Basin stands the best chance of being peacefully resolved.
171 See Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 245-55. Specifically, Turkey has seen
the capture ofAbdullah Ocalan as an opportunity to improve its image on hu-
man rights through treating Ocalan with strict "legal formalities." See Kinzer,
supra note 168.
172 See Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 255.
173 See id. at 255-56.
174 See id. at 218.
175 See AMER: SYRIA, supra note 131, at 8.
176 See id. at 8; Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 255.
17 Indeed, Syria has repeatedly asked the United Nations to expedite its
work on the Convention so that it would have a framework of international
law under which to resolve disputes between the states. See MFA, supra note
59, S HB.
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Finding a solution to the Euphrates water crisis is further
hampered by the political situation in Iraq. Since the Gulf War in
1991, relations between Iraq and the West have been strained. Re-
lations between Iraq and Turkey- historical allies in the region-
have also been strained due to Turkey's tacit support of the
West's confrontation with Iraq.'78 In addition, due to the U.N.
trade sanctions and embargo on Iraq," 9 it is largely unable to sell
oil. This makes it more difficult for Iraq to purchase water or
crops to make up for any shortfall caused by the recent restric-
tions on Euphrates River flow. Until the U.N. sanctions are
lifted, it is unlikely that Iraq will abandon its hard-line position
on absolute territorial integrity and ancient rights. Given its cur-
rent economic situation, it can hardly afford to do so.
The political situation in the Middle East, then, further com-
plicates the problem of finding a solution at international law to
the water crisis. This Comment has outlined some of the more
specific and immediate -political issues affecting the situation, but
relations between countries in the Middle East are quite complex.
It seems clear, however, that before public international law is
able to provide a lasting solution to the water problems, there
must be some sort of political agreement that brings stability to
the region.
6. INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ISLAMIC LAW
There is a general agreement that Islamic law is ill-equipped to
create solutions for the Euphrates River water crisis. 8 While this
issue is beyond the scope of this Comment, it seems clear that,
while Islamic law and public international law share some impor-
tant features, they also contain a few differences that may substan-
tially impede the effective use of public international law in solv-
ing this water crisis.
178 See text accompanying supra note 8.
179 See generally Tod Robberson, Use-By Dates Not a Big Problem, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Jan. 15, 1991, at 6 (discussing the effects of the embargo on
Iraq).
1SO See Thomas Naff, International Riparian Law in Islamic and Western
Systems: A Comparative Analysis (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author); Westbrook, supra note 142.
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Islamic law is based on the concept of "shari'a", or divine
law."8 ' Some scholars have noted a superficial sense of hope of Is-
lamic law in this situation, noting that "shari'a" originally meant
"the path to the watering place." 112 While this may seem to indi-
cate Islamic law is well suited to address the Euphrates water cri-
sis, the concept of "shari'a" actually highlights one of the princi-
pal differences between Islamic Law and public international law.
"Shari'a" is an expression of God's will, and it is believed that
God's will involves power with legal authority.'83 One scholar
has defined the Islamic suspicion of political institutions and dis-
trust in the governing authority of the nation-state by explaining
that from the Islamic perspective, "the exercise of politics is likely
to be willful and involve men in untruth, or in rebellion against
the divine will."184 Such a perspective explains why Islamic law
would be suspicious of public international law, which is based on
both the concept of the nation-state and the proceedings of politi-
cal institutions such as the U.N. and World Trade Organization
("WTO").85 Interestingly, Westbrook has suggested that this dif-
ference in willingness to use international discourse may stem
from Western society's historical reliance in the institution of the
church as a mediator of disputes and a source of law. The Islamic
experience of God is, however, "unmediated by a church."8 6
Islamic Law is based on the pursuit of finding God's will and
performing it- a conceptual method known as "fiqh."8 7 West-
brook states that one could view this facet of Islamic law optimis-
tically because it may lead Turkey, Syria, and Iraq towards a
communal management system of the Euphrates River Basin.'88
This scholar points out that the "shari'a" "allocates community
water among users and calls upon water users from time to time
to maintain the communal water system." 9 But Westbrook ar-
gues that this opinion is likely the product of wishful thinking.19
181 See Westbrook, supra note 150, at 823.
182 Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 259-60.
183 See Westbrook, supra note 150, at 823.
184 Id. at 864.
185 See id.
186 Id. at 866 n. 121.
187 Id. at 825, 845-49.
118 See Dellapenna, supra note 8, at 259-60.
189 Id. at 260.
190 See Westbrook, supra note 150, at 848.
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Not only does it fail to recognize that the political situation in the
Middle East must be stabilized before anything resembling a
shared water management commission could be arranged between
the three riparians, it also fails on the same criteria as the peace
pipeline.191 While a communal water management commission
may be capable of solving the problem of water allocation fa-
cially, it will not be able to resolve the question of sovereignty
over the Euphrates River, which all three riparians jealously pro-
tect.
Westbrook notes that for a Muslim intellectual contemplating
international law, "the devil's choice is posed: either adopt the
culture of the West, and lose one's culture and thus oneself, or re-
nounce the culture of the West, and lose one's role in the modern
world.""9 Certainly, the claim that Muslim nations must com-
pletely avoid Western legal institutions is unfounded, as every
member of the Arab League is also a member of the United Na-
tions.'93 Yet it is true that, among Islamic nations, there remains a
distrust of Western institutions, a desire to retain Muslim culture
despite partially integrating with the West, and a lasting belief in
the immutability of God's law. These factors remain an obstacle
to the effective use of public international law in the Euphrates
River Basin.
7. CONCLUSION
To the complications created by the political situation in the
Middle East, conflict between Islamic Law and Public Interna-
tional Law, and the structure of Public International Law itself,
one can add a host of smaller issues. Those that I have discussed
above are simply the most important ones. One other issue,
however bears mention: the increasing population of the region.
In a world that is experiencing alarming global growth in popula-
tion, the Middle East as a region is experiencing particularly dra-
matic increases. 94 Both Syria and Iraq have been and continue to
191 See supra Section 5.1.
192 See Westbrook, supra note 142, at 848.
193 For a list of United Nation member nations, see UNITED NATIONS,
COMMEMORATION OF THE FORTIETH ANNiVERSARY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: STATEMENTS AND MESSAGES (1995).
"' See Joel L. Swerdlow, Population, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 1998, at
"Millennium Supplement: Population."
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experience population growth at a rate of two and a half to three
per annum, greatly exacerbating a pre-existing situation of water
scarcity.195 This only makes the riparians of the river system that
much less eager to abandon their respective notions of sovereignty
vis-a'-vis the river and its waters. Ironically, Turkey, the only wa-
ter rich nation in the region, has the lowest population growth.196
The only ray of hope that this offers is that international legal
doctrine does give a clear preference in water rights to that water
needed to support a population. This would seem to give some
generally accepted legitimacy to the claims of the lower riparians
on the Euphrates, since most of the water claimed by the GAP
project is not needed for basic human sustenance.
It may be that, as is the case with so many world problems,
attempts to solve the water crisis in the Euphrates River Basin
should focus on population control, rather than on the crisis per
se. After all, much of the crisis stems from projected shortfalls
around 2020 when population levels will have dramatically in-
creased. In any event then, the political situation in the Middle
East, conflicts with Islamic Law, rampant population growth in
the arid Middle East, and the structural incompatibilities between
public international law and the water crisis, all present major ob-
stacles that must be addressed before public international law can
truly be effective in the region.
195 See id.
196 See id.
197 See SOFFER, supra note 12, at 105.
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